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Clark: Appeals from Equity Decrees in Montana

Appeals from Equity Decrees
in Montana
HO MR CLARK*

Montana, like most other states, has for most purposes
abolished the historic distinctions between the courts of law and
In spite
equity and between actions at law and suits in equity
of this attempt at simplification, however, several distinctions
between actions at law and suits in equity still remain to trouble
courts, lawyers and students., One of these is the difference in
the power of the Supreme Court to consider the evidence and
reverse the decision of the district court for error in finding the
facts. It is the purpose of this paper to define the Supreme
Court's power to do this in equity, as compared with its technique in actions at law, and to question the value of the distinction between the two types of litigation.
The distinction was created by the enactment of the following sentence as part of the general statute governing the powers
and duties of the Supreme Court :'
". .. In equity cases, and in matters and proceedings of
an equitable nature, the Supreme Court shall review all
questions of fact arising upon the evidence presented in
the record, whether the same be presented by specifications of particulars in which the evidence is alleged to be
insufficient or not, and determine the same, as well as
questions of law, unless, for good cause, a new trial or the
taking of further evidence in the court below be ordered;
provided, that nothing herein shall be construed to
abridge, in any manner, the powers of the Supreme Court
in other cases."
This sentence came into the Codes in the late fall of 1903,
under unusual circumstances.! At that time the war between
*Assistant Professor of Law, Montana State University.
'Mont. Oon8t. Art. VIII, §§ 3, 11, 28; R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2301 (9008).
9R.C.M. 1947, § 93-216 (8805).
'The events leading to the passage of this statute are well known in
Montana, at least among the older residents. Complete accounts of
them can be found in the following historical studies: RoBERT GEORGE

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1951

1

Montana Law Review, Vol. 12 [1951], Iss. 1, Art. 3
APPEALS FROM EQUITY DECREES
F. Augustus Heinze and the Amalgamated Copper Company for
control of the mines of Butte was at its height, in the courtroom
and underground. As one battle in that war, John MacGinniss,
a Heinze man, having bought a few shares of stock in the Boston
& Montana Consolidated Copper & Silver Mining Company,
brought a stockholder's derivative suit against that corporation
and the Amalgamated Copper Company.' The complaint in this
suit alleged that the Amalgamated Company had been organized
to secure a monopoly in the production and sale of copper, that
it had bought a majority of shares in the Boston & Montana
Company for that purpose, that it was illegally doing business
in Montana, and that the rights of minority stockholders of the
Boston & Montana Company would be injured by Amalgamated's
activities. The complaint asked that an injunction be granted
forbidding the Amalgamated from voting its stock in the Boston
& Montana Company, or from receiving dividends in the stock,
and forbidding the transfer of the stock to Amalgamated on the
books of Boston & Montana. A decree that Amalgamated was
an illegal trust, enjoining it from doing business in Montana, and
giving other relief, was also prayed.
On October 22, 1903, Judge William Clancy of Silver Bow
County, allegedly also a Heinze man, granted an injunction
pendente lite in this case. His order restrained the Boston &
Montana Company from allowing its stock to be transferred to
Amalgamated, from allowing Amalgamated to vote the stock,
and from paying any dividends to Amalgamated.
This decree was immediately followed by cessation of all of
Amalgamated's operations in Montana. Most accounts agree
that fifteen thousand men were out of work, since the stoppage
closed mines, smelters, lumber mills, and all of the connected
businesses controlled by Amalgamated. Both sides then attempted to appeal to the idle miners for support, but as the
mines and smelters remained closed, and distress and confusion
increased, Governor Toole received large numbers of letters and
telegrams demanding that something be done by the government
of the state. He and other state officers were unable to arrange
a compromise until Amalgamated's officers made an offer to reRAYMEM, MONTANA, THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE (1930) Vol. I, pp. 490-

494; CHRISTOPHER CONNOLLY, THE DEVIL LEARNS TO VOTE (1938) pp.
283-294; HELN F. SANDERS, A HIsTORY OF MONTANA (1913) p. 369;
TOm STouT, MONTANA (1921) pp. 460-41; JosEPH KINSEY HOWARD,
MONTANA, HIGH, WIDE, AND HANDSOME (1943) pp. 73-81.
'The appeal from the granting of the injunction pendente lite appears
as MacGinniss v. Boston & Montana Consolidated C. & S. Mining Co.
(1903) 29 Mont. 428, 75 P. 89.
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sume work on condition that a special session of the state legislature be called for the purpose of enacting a "Fair Trial" Bill.
The legislature was called,' and the mines, mills, and smelters reopened.
The legislature met on December 1, 1903, and passed this
bill, one section of which gave the Supreme Court the power to
review the facts in equity cases,' in the language previously
quoted. Two other changes were made by this bill, one providing for change of venue on certain conditions' and the other for
disqualification of a judge upon the filing of an affidavit by a
party that he has reason to believe, and does believe, that he
cannot have an impartial trial before that judge.!
Before 1903 in Montana appeals in equity were considered
and decided under the same rules as appeals from legal judgments. The statute then in force made no distinction between
the two types of appeal' and the cases made none. As much respect was paid to the findings of fact in an equity case as to the
verdict of a jury. The language of the cases made this plain.
One equity case said that findings of fact must stand on appeal
if there is evidence to support them.' To be compared with this
is the action at law, typical of many, in which the Supreme
Court said that the findings below would not be disturbed if
there was evidence to support them.' The case of Austin v.
Ingalls' is explicit on the subject. ". . . and where, as in the
present case, the evidence is conflicting, the findings of fact and
judgment thereon by the court will not be reversed on that account, but rests upon the same principle, as does the verdict
of a jury, when the evidence is conflicting."
This earlier Montana procedure was unlike that in many
other states and unlike the English equity procedure which had
'Proclamation, LAws or MONTANA, Second Extraordinary Session, 1903.
Ch. 1, LAws oF MONTANA, Second Extraordinary Session, 1903. Now
R.C.M. 1947 § 93-216 (8805).
'Ch. 2, LAws OF MONTANA, Second Extraordinary Session, 1903. Now
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2906 (9098).
'Ch. 3, LAws OF MONTANA, Second Extraordinary Session, 1903. This act
is found in amended form in R.C.M. 1947, § 93-901 (8868).
1'Code of Civil Procedure, 1895, § 21.
McCauley v. Tyler (1891) 11 Mont. 51, 27 P. 391.
'Story v. Black (1883) 5 Mont. 26, 1 P. 1.
1(1889) 8 Mont. 333, 336, 20 P. 637, 638. See also Phillips v. Coburn
(1903) 28 Mont. 45, 72 P. 291 ; Wetzstein v. Largey (1902) 27 Mont. 212,
70 P. 717; Travis v. McCormick (1871) 1 Mont. 347; Caruthers v. Pemberton (1869) 1 Mont. 111. An early action at law often cited on this
point is Ming v. Truett (1871) 1 Mont. 322, in which the court discusses
at length the necessity of respecting the trial judge's decision on matters of fact.
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developed by the middle of the Nineteenth Century, before the
reforms of 1852 and 1875. Under the English practice of that
date evidence was obtained by having witnesses answer written
interrogatories, in private, and their answers recorded as depositions. When all the testimony had been taken, it was published.'
The case was heard on evidence so obtained.' Appeals could be
taken from the vice-chancellor or master of the Rolls to the
chancellor, and from him to the House of Lords. At both stages,
issues of fact could be reexamined, and the chancellor could take
new evidence, although the House of Lords could not.' An appeal in equity was most strikingly distinguished from the common law writ of error by its leading to a rehearing of the entire
case.' Such a rehearing was entirely sensible because of the
method of taking evidence. Since the court of first resort decided the case on written testimony without seeing any witnesses
and without an opportunity to question them, and since the appellate court had before it the same evidence, it had just as good
an opportunity to judge what the facts were, weigh the evidence
and form an opinion of credibility as the trial court.
The English custom of complete review of facts and law in
equity was brought to this country and was adopted in most
states, even though the former English equity method of taking
evidence was generally abandoned in the Nineteenth Century,
and oral testimony used.1' The same practice was carried into
many codes in states adopting code procedure, although the
courts in applying the codes were reluctant to engage in a complete de novo review of facts even in equity cases, and, therefore,
customarily said that some more or less undefined weight would
be given to the findings of lower courts on questions of fact.'
It may be that these codes influenced the drafting of Montana's 1903 statute, although in view of the circumstances surrounding the Act's passage, that seems doubtful. The wording
of the Montana statute does not resemble that of other state
statutes on the subject, most of them being more specific.' T)he
1'9

HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926) pp. 340, 353.

Id. at 365-368.
'59 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (19M) p. 369; 2 DANIEL,
CHANCERY PIEADING AND PRACTICE (6th Am. ed. 1894) pp. 1439-1485.
169 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1926) p. 373; Orfleld, Appellate Procedure in Equity, 90 PA. L. R. 563, 565.
"POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1941) p. 298.

'Id. at 300-302.

'See for example Rev. Stat. of Neb. (1943) § 25-1925, providing for trial
de novo of suits in equity before the Supreme Court and requiring an
independent conclusion on the facts without reference to the trial
court's decision.
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Washington statute, applicable to any judge-tried case, legal
or equitable, resembles that of Montana most closely, in requiring that the evidence "shall be examined" and that "the cause
shall be determined by the record on appeal."' In any event
the Montana statute does not seem to have been copied from
that of any other state, nor have the cases from other jurisdictions been persuasive in developing its meaning. Due to a vagueness in the statute which was perhaps intentional, and to difficulties inherent in appellate procedure, that meaning can be
made clear only by answering two questions: (1) Did the
statute change existing practice in equity appeals? (2) If so, to
what extent did it allow the Supreme Court to consider and decide questions of fact?
The wording of the statute itself gives little help in answering these questions. It would seem obvious from the history of
the statute and the reasons for its enactment that its proponents
and the legislature which passed it intended to change existing
practice. Unfortunately what was obvious in 1903 may be far
from obvious in 1951. Reading the words in their context in the
rest of the section leaves considerable doubt that they require the
Supreme Court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court on matters of fact, since the Supreme Court could very well
''review" and "determine" questions of fact just as they always
had, that is by reviewing them and determining whether there
was substantial evidence in support of the findings. With such
an ambiguous statute, it is surprising to find that none of the
cases construing the Act refer to its history, so far as the writer
has been able to discover, in spite of the fact that it has been
held permissible in this state to refer to the history of the period
in which the statute was passed, as an aid to construction.' Even
if the history behind this Act leads to the conclusion that it did
accomplish a change, the statutory language and its background
do not clearly define the extent of that change. Definition is
difficult at best on an issue of this kind. All that can be done
is roughly to describe what the attitude of the Supreme Court
shall be when errors of fact are asserted, and to require either a
complete and independent reexamination, or something less.
This statute does not even become that explicit, leaving the
Supreme Court quite free to respect the trial court's findings to
whatever extent it thinks desirable.
With a statute of that kind as a starting point, a thorough
investigation of the cases becomes necessary. The cases as sources
14 Reungton, Rev. Stat. of Wash., § 1736.
'Fergus Motor Co. v. Sorenson (1925) 73 Mont. 122, 235 P. 422.
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of information have their defects also here. The reason is that
the question involved is one of the Supreme Court's attitude, a
very nebulous question and yet a very important one. In any
given case it is impossible to say certainly that a different attitude on the part of the Supreme Court would have produced a
different result. No one can be sure, in other words, that on a
given record the Supreme Court would affirm if required to
apply the pre-1903 attitude of refusing to disturb findings supported by some evidence, but would reverse if they could have
made an independent decision on the facts. Thus a reversal has
no great force as a holding on this issue. That leaves the investigator to discover from the language used in the opinion
what principle the Supreme Court followed in the case. As any
lawyer knows, dictum is an unreliable guide if not read in very
close connection with the facts of the case in which it was uttered, but for this purpose we are forced to rely on it.
The earliest cases decided after the passage of the 1903
statute are of no help to our solution because they completely
ignore the statute and state the rule in the very terms used by
the pre-1903 cases.' The first case which discusses the effect of
the statute is Hays v. Buzard.' That case was a suit in equity
to determine a water right, and presented the single question
whether the interest claimed by the plaintiff passed to him under
certain conveyances, as an appurtenance to his land. This question turned to some extent upon the use made of the water by
'Hendrickson v. Wallace (1904) 29 Mont. 504, 75 P. 355: In a suit for
injunction and damages the court assumed the cause of action to be
equitable and affirmed upon evidence substantially in conflict. See
also Landeau v. Frazier (1904) 30 Mont. 267, 76 P. 290, a suit to impose a trust on real estate and for other equitable relief, refusing to
disturb findings based on conflicting evidence.
2(1904) 31 Mont. 74, 77 P. 423. An earlier case, Forrester v. Boston &
Montana Consol. C. & S. Mining Co. '(1904) 30 Mont. 181, 76 P. 2, conceded for purposes of argument that the 1903 statute authorized a trial
de novo in the Supreme Court, but found the evidence inadequate for
the purpose. It does not throw much light on the construction of the
statute.
There are several later cases which seem to reach the same result as
Hayes v. Buzard, without citing it. In Walsh v. Hoskins (1917) 53
Mont. 198, 162 P. 960, no finding was made on a crucial issue of fact,
and the Supreme Court held that it could make a finding, under the
statute. Lowry v. Carrier (1918) 55 Mont 392, 177 P. 756, contains language to the effect that the statute authorizes the Supreme Court to
decide the case on the merits. Harrison v. Riddell (1922) 64 Mont. 466,
210 P. 460, says that the Supreme Court may make independent findings of fact. State ex rel. U. S. F. & G. Co. v. District Court (1926)
77 Mont. 594, 251 P. 1061, contains dictum to the effect that the Supreme
Court must try the case on the merits. To the same effect is In Re
Connolly's Estate (1927) 79 Mont. 445, 257 P. 418.
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the parties, as to which the evidence was conflicting. The court,
Justice Brantly writing the opinion, gave a complete statement
of the evidence and affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence fully supported the findings of fact, citing the law of
1903.' The significant thing about the case is the expression
which it contains of Brantly's understanding of the statute:
"Excluding the evidence complained of, and weighing the remainder of it in the record in order to determine the rights of the parties thereon as an original proposition, we think that the findings of the trial court should
not be disturbed, as the evidence preponderates in favor
of the conclusions reached by it.'" (Italics added)
The quoted sentence, especially the italicized clause, clearly shows that the Court in this early case believed it was required to conduct an independent retrial of the facts in equity
cases, on the evidence in the record. Not only did the Court say
a retrial was necessary, but the outcome plainly shows that it
actually did retry the case. It found that incompetent evidence
had been admitted, conceded that the incompetent evidence had
probably influenced the findings, went on to examine the competent evidence in the record, and finally made its own decision
based on the competent evidence alone. No weight could have
been placed on the trial court's findings of fact here because
those findings were concededly made on improper evidence. This
case therefore is about as clear authority as can be obtained for
the position that the 1903 statute not only changed the prior
rule, but required a trial de novo on all factual issues. This is
the position which is most strongly supported by the history of
the statute, and most easily and clearly defined. There would
certainly be no doubt about the extent of the Court's powers
under this construction. Certainty is not the only, or even the
most important, consideration in the law, however, and the fate
of the Hays case can best be indicated by saying that it has not
been cited on this point to this day.
In fact only a year later the Court retreated from its position, without mention of the Hays case. Bordeaux v. Bordeaux"
was a suit for divorce on grounds of adultery with a defense of
condonation. On the appeal the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that the charge of adultery had been proved, but
held that the offenses had been condoned, reversing a decree for
the plaintiff. In reply to the plaintiff's assertion that the Court
'31 Mont. at 84, 77 P. at 426.
2'31 Mont. at 85, 77 P. at 427.
(1905) 32 Mont. 159, 80 P. 6.
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could not upset the findings below, Justice Brantly said that
that rule had been changed by the statute of 1903. He went on
to disclaim deciding whether the Court already had power to
decide questions of fact, and contented himself with saying that
the earlier cases no longer applied to equitable causes of action.
At this point he departed from the Hays case, however, to say
that this new duty of the Supreme Court to reach its own conclusions on the facts must be performed with "a due regard for
the findings of the district court, based as they are, upon the
testimony of witnesses delivered ore tenus in the presence of the
court.' '' Justice Brantly further emphasized the need for selfrestraint on the part of the Supreme Court and then used the
language often quoted by later cases to the effect that "where
the conflict is trifling or unsubstantial or where the evidence
preponderates decidedly against the finding,' the Court may examine the evidence and make up its own mind on the facts. On
the facts of this case there was little conflict as to what had occurred between the parties, the only real issue being whether the
events proved amounted to condonation. It was on this point
that the judgment was reversed.
The Bordeaux case thus meant that the Court continued to
think that the statute of 1903 changed existing law in equity
cases, but that the freedom to examine facts was limited to cases
where the evidence decidedly preponderated against the findings. This was a definition of the Supreme Court's powers
falling somewhere between the very limited definition of the
pre-1903 cases and the unlimited one of the Hays case. It clearly was a recognition that the Supreme Court is not a fact-finding
body and is not equipped for fact-finding. Where the evidence
is in the form of written depositions, as in English equity procedure before the reforms, an appellate court can as effectively
judge the facts as the lower court. Where evidence is taken
orally, in the presence of the trial court, it is generally conceded
that the trial court alone is able to form an accurate opinion of
the facts. Some persons are skeptical of the trial court's ability
to discover what happened with accuracy,* but nearly all agree
that the appellate court cannot form an accurate impression of
the facts." The stenographic record, even if correct in every de"82 Mont. at 166, 80 P. at 8.
"'32 Mont. at 167, 80 P. at 9.
2FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949) pp. 16-23.
'*COMMENT NOTE, ADVANTAGE WHICH THE ORIGINAL TRIER Or FACTS EN-

JOYED OVER REVIEWING COURT FROM OPPORTUNITY OF SEEING AND HEAING WITNwsm

Ill

A.L.R. 742.
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tail, is a long step removed from the trial.' It is this fact which
no doubt led the Supreme Court in the Bordeaux case to state
its attitude toward factual questions in cautious terms.
The same caution is used by courts in other states where the
statutory authority is more explicit than in Montana. Although
the statutes have clearly stated that a trial de novo is to be
granted on appeal, the courts have just refused to follow them.'
The doctrine of the Bordeaux case seemed to be well established after Finlen v. Heinze, which in effect followed it, using
somewhat different language. That was an action of ejectment,
with a counterclaim for specific performance of a contract to
convey mining leases. There was a clear conflict in the evidence
as to whether there had been an oral agreement to convey the
leases. The Court's opinion discussed the evidence at great
length. The effect of the 1903 statute was described as being to
place on the Supreme Court the duty to review the facts rather
than to try them de novo, and to require a reversal of the findings only where the preponderance of the evidence is against
them." The Court also held the 1903 Act constitutional, in the
face of an argument that it imposed an original jurisdiction on
the Supreme Court which could only be given to the district
courts under the constitution. The opinion did not deal with
the question whether the statute might violate the constitutional
provision establishing but one form of civil action. This case
has been thought to be in the line of cases' beginning with Bor"Orfield, Supra, note 16 at p. 595, states that the use of court stenographers enables appellate courts to find facts more effectively, but surely
it must be admitted that the stenographic record is a very poor substitute for hearing the testimony. See also Judge Brantly's dissent in
Finlen v. Heinze (1905) 32 Mont. 354, 391, 80 P. 918, 928, saying that
the appellate court can try the case de novo where evidence is by deposition, but that it is under a serious handicap where evidence is taken
orally.
'Supra, note 17. In Nebraska, which has a most explicit statutory requirement of a trial de novo, the Supreme Court still has said that it
will pay considerable attention to the trial court's findings. See for
example Otto v. L. L. Coryell & Son (1942) 141 Neb. 498, 3 N.W. (2d)
915.
3(1905) 32 Mont. 354, 80 P. 918.
"'32Mont. at 380, 80 P. at 923.
"The following cases seem to follow Bordeaux and Finlen. The list is
not exhaustive: Delmoe v. Long (1907) 35 Mont. 139, 88 P. 778; Pope
v. Alexander (1907) 36 Mont. 82, 92 P. 203; Copper Mountain Mining
& S. Co. v. Butte & Corbin Consol. C. & S. M. Co. (1909) 39 Mont. 487,
104 P. 540; Murray v.Butte-Monitor Tunnel Mining Co. (1910) 41 Mont.
449, 110 P. 497; O'Neil v. First National Bank of Billings (1911) 43
Mont. 505, 117 P. 889; Boyd v. Huffine (1911) 44 Mont. 306, 120 P.
228; Ferris v. McNally (1912) 45 Mont. 20, 121 P. 889; Winslow v.
Dundom (1912) 46 Mont. 71, 125 P. 136; Barnard Realty Co. v. Butte
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deaux v. Bordeaux, which it cited and on which it heavily relied,
holding that the power of the Supreme Court to review the facts
was greater than it had been before 1903 but less than a full
power to exercise an independent judgment. This line of cases
is strong and still important. The cases in this group decided
by Justice Brantly clearly and explicitly state that the limitation on what would appear to be the meaning of this statute is
solely due to the appellate court's lack of opportunity to judge
credibility and observe the witnesses.' His formulation of this
doctrine is a compromise, made in the interests of workable judicial administration, between the requirements of the statute as
construed by the Hays case and the practical necessities of the
appellate court's position in the court system.
It may be suggested that this compromise is not different
from the pre-1903 rule, and is in effect a nullification of the
statute. One case shows that that is not so, or at least was not
at the time Justice Brantly developed the compromise. In Barnard Realty Co. v. City of Butte, a suit to quiet title to real
estate, the district court gave a decree for the defendant. On
appeal the contention was that the evidence did not support a
finding that there had been public travel over the area in dis(1918) 55 Mont. 384, 177 P. 402; Stettheimer v. Butte (1921) 60 Mont.
111, 198 P. 455 (semble) ; Violet v. Martin (1922) 62 Mont. 335, 206 P.
221; Gray v. Grant (1922) 62 Mont. 452, 206 P. 410 (semble) ; Leigland
v. Rundle Land & Abstract Co. (1922) 64 Mont. 154, 208 P. 1075; Nolan
v. Benninghoff (1922) 64 Mont. 68, 208 P. 905; Sanger v. Huguenel
(1922) 65 Mont. 236, 211 P. 349; Kummrow v. Bank of Fergus County
(1924) 66 Mont. 434, 214 P. 1098; Geibler v. Geibler (1924) 69 Mont.
347, 222 P. 436; Allen v. Petrick (1924) 69 Mont. 373, 222 P. 451 ; Hamble v. St. John (1925) 72 Mont. 519, 234 P. 475; First National Bank v.
Robbe (1925) 72 Mont. 527, 235 P. 327; Stanton v. Occidental Life Ins.
Co. (1927) 81 Mont. 44, 261 P. 620; Shepherd & Pierson Co. v. Baker
(1927) 81 Mont. 185, 262 P. 887; Dahlberg v. Lannen (1929) 84 Mont.
68, 274 P. 151; Laundreville v. Mere (1929) 86 Mont. 43, 281 P. 749;
Fonsek v. DeForest (1931) 90 Mont. 448, 4 P. (2d) 472; State ex reL
Nagle v. Naughton (1936) 103 Mont. 306, 63 P. (2d) 123 (semble,
though some language in the case is most confusing) ; H. Earl Clack
Co. v. Oltesvig (1937) 104 Mont. 255, 68 P. (2d) 586; Gibbs v. Gardner
(1938) 107 Mont. 76, 80 P. (2d) 370; Cook v. Hudson (1940) 110 Mont.
263, 103 P. (2d) 137; Kranjec v. Belinak (1942) 114 Mont. 26, 132 P.
(2d) 150; Lewis v. Bowman (1942) 113 Mont. 68, 121 P. (2d) 162; Miller
v. Miller (1948) 121 Mont. 55, 190 P. (2d) 72 (semble) ; Hart v. Barron (1949) ......
Mont .......
204 P. (2d) 797.
'Koopman v. Mansolf (1915) 51 Mont. 48, 149 P. 491; Yellowstone National Bank v. McCullough (1916) 51 Mont. 590, 154 P. 919. Cf. Bubler
v. Loftus (1917) 53 Mont. 546, 165 P. 601, a suit to cancel notes and a
mortgage for fraud, in which, although plainly an equitable action, the
Court applies the legal rule, saying that the only issue on the appeal
is whether there was substantial evidence to support the findings. This
appears to be inconsistent with Justice Brantley's other opinions.
'(1918) 55 Mont. 384, 177 P. 402.
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pute, from 1899 to 1911, so as to give the city an easement by
prescription. The Court, by Justice Brantly, thoroughly reviewed the evidence and reversed the decree, directing entry of
a decree for the plaintiff. In doing this, it used the following
language :
"If this were a case at law in which the evidence were
in the condition disclosed in the record, we would be compelled to sustain a verdict for the defendant, because we
could go no further than to determine whether the evidence introduced by the city made out a prima facie case.
In equity cases, however, such as this, we are required to
review and to determine all questions of fact as well as of
law, unless for good cause a new trial ought to be ordered ....

The rule here declared is of necessity subject

to the limitation that in determining questions of fact, due
allowance must be made for the more advantageous position occupied by the trial judge, in that he has had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and appearance of the
witnesses while testifying. [Citing cases.] After a careful examination of the large volume of evidence . . .we

are constrained to the conclusion that the weight of it is
decidedly against the conclusions reached by the trial
court."
This is the only case the writer has found which says in so
many words that on the evidence in the record the findings
would have to be affirmed but for the statutory command.
The reasoning of these cases' has not been applied without
some difficulty by the Supreme Court, perhaps partly because
of its reliance on a form of words without clear awareness of
the problem to which the words refer. In some of the early cases
it was said that findings would be upset only where a "clear
preponderance'
or a "decided preponderance'. of the evidence was against them. Other cases picked up these phrases
and applied them in such a way that it is difficult to discover
what they mean. For instance several cases state that findings
will be reversed where there is a preponderance of evidence
against them, sometimes equating this with the statement that
there must be a clear preponderance or decided preponderance
of evidence contrary to the findings." But if only a preponder155 Mont. at 391, 177 P. at 405.

a'Supra, notes 35, 36.
"'Finlen v. Heinze (1905) 32 Mont 354, 80 P. 918.
'Pope v. Alexander (1907) 36 Mont. 82, 92 P. 203.
'Murray v. Butte-Monitor Tunnel Min. Co. (1910) 41 Mont. 449, 110 P.
497; Stettheimer v. City of Butte (1921) 60 Mont. 111, 198 P. 455; National Bank of Anaconda v. Yegen (1928) 83 Mont. 265, 271 P. 612;
Haynes v. FlUner (1938) 106 Mont 59, 75 P. (2d) 802.
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ance need be shown, that is the very question which a trial court
decides, and if that is the rule the Supreme Court is making an
independent judgment on the facts without regard to the findings.' If the Supreme Court can reverse whenever it disagrees
with the district court about the preponderance of the evidence,
then it is in effect substituting its judgment on the facts for that
of the district court. Presumably these cases do not mean to
adopt this doctrine, but they are certainly open to that construction.
Regardless of the Supreme Court's general approach, several cases make it plain that that general approach may yield to
a case in which the evidence is in such form that the Supreme
Court can evaluate it just as well as the district court. This occurs for example where the evidence is entirely documentary, or
in the form of depositions." The reason for this is of course
that when the practical difficulties preventing the full review
of facts commanded by the statute are removed, a full review
is given.
Conversely, if the record is in such condition that the Supreme Court cannot judge the facts as effectively as usual, it
will further limit its scope of review. This may happen when
significant parts of the evidence are left out of the record on
appeal.' It has also happened when the record presented the
evidence in narrative form rather than in question and answer
form, due to counsel's violation of the Rule of Court formerly
in force.'
"Exchange State Bank v. Occident Elevator Co. (1933) 95 Mont. 44, 24
P. (2d) 126; 9 WIGMORE oN EVrDLNCE (3rd ed. 1940) § 2498 defines the
extent of persuasion in a civil case as the requirement that there must
be a "preponderance of evidence" in favor of the party who Is to prevail.
"In re Colbert's Estate (1915) 51 Mont. 455, 153 P. 1022 (Evidence consisted chiefly of depositions.) See also Hoppin v. Lang (1928) 81 Mont.
330, 263 P. 421, in which the district court tried the case on the record
made in a prior trial of the same case. The Supreme Court said that
it was in as good position to evaluate the written record as the trial
court, so that the trial court's findings would not be as persuasive as in
the ordinary case.
'"Yellowstone National Bank v. McCullough (1916) 51 Mont. 590, 154 P.
919.
"OKoopman v. Mansolf (1915) 51 Mont. 48, 149 P. 491; Security State
Bank of Havre v. McIntyre (1924) 71 Mont. 18, 228 P. 618; Stephenson
v. Rainbow Flying Service (1935) 99 Mont. 241, 42 P. (2d) 735; Rules
of the Supreme Court, VII, 3, 87 Mont. at page xxil, required testimony
to be in narrative form in the record, except that in equity cases presenting questions of fact for review by the Supreme Court the testimony
had to be in question and answer form. The present rule of course
requires all records to present the evidence in question and answer
form, Rules of the Supreme Court, VIII, 5, 120 Mont. at p. _U, so that
cases of this kind would no longer arise.
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The Supreme Court has shown the same flexibility in adapting rules to conditions where the issue is the granting of a new
trial. In Gibson v. Morris State Bank" it held that where the
motion for new trial in equity came before a judge other than
the one who originally heard the case, he should follow the 1903
statute and the cases construing it, looking at the evidence with
awareness that the original trier of fact was in a superior position for determining what the facts of the controversy were.
This case could not come up today since the statute no longer
allows a motion for new trial in equity on the ground of insufficient evidence. The case is nevertheless interesting as an example of the application of a statute dealing with practice on
appeal to the new trial situation, which usually raises quite different problems."
The presence of so many cases adopting the compromise view
of the 1903 statute's effect and of the Supreme Court's power
to review facts does not mean that there has been no conflict
upon the Court about these matters. In fact there is an almost
equally numerous line of cases stoutly maintaining that the 1903
statute changed nothing, and that the scope of review of facts
in equity cases is precisely the same as in actions at law where
the facts are tried to a jury. This line of cases can be traced
back to an early date. In Watkins v. Watkins," for example,
a quiet title suit involving water rights, the Court discussed the
problem at considerable length. It started by purporting to
follow the Bordeauxe case, saying that findings may only be
upset where they are contrary to the decided preponderance of
the evidence, although the facts must be reviewed under the
statute. It then proceeded to define "decided preponderance"
in such terms that the result seems to be an affirmance where
there is any substantial evidence in support of the findings below:
"It will then endeavor . . . to determine whether
there is any substantial support for the findings in the
evidence. . . . If . . . we determine that the testimony
furnishes reasonable ground for different conclusions,
then we will hold that there is no decided preponderance
in the evidence against the findings and decline to disturb
them. ')
The chief issue of fact in this case concerned the genuine"(1914)
"R.C.M.
"(1909)
'(1905)

49 Mont. 60, 140 P. 76.
1947, §§ 93-5602 (9396), 93-5603 (9397).
39 Mont. 367, 102 P. 860.
32 Mont. 159, 80 P.'6.

"39 Mont. at 370, 102 P. at 861.
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ness of the signature on an instrument of conveyance. The
Court affirmed a judgment for the defendant, saying that there
were reasonable grounds for differing conclusions as to the facts.
The review of the facts is made in the same way that the Court
usually reviews facts in jury cases, which is explainable only as
a misapprehension of the Bordeaux case and Finlen v. Heinze,
on which the Court relied.
Many cases since Watkins v. Watkins? have stated the doctrine of that case in even more explicit terms, although some of
them cause uncertainty by their failure to cite or refer to the
1903 statute.'
The cases cited all are equity cases, however,
and even though the Court's attention was not directed by counsel to the statute, it would appear that they are strong authority
for the limited scope of review borrowed from actions at law.
Several cases reach this result after a full discussion of the
statute, so that they are more persuasive authorities. Bosanatz
v. OstronicV was a suit to impose a trust upon a half interest
in a mining claim. The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment
for the defendant upon conflicting evidence of the partnership
agreement which was the basis for the suit. The Court in doing
so said that the findings of fact made by a trial judge in an
equity case are to be treated on review exactly like the verdict
of a jury, to be upheld if there is a substantial conflict in the
evidence. Upon rehearing, after counsel for the plaintiff had
strongly argued the effect of the statute, the Court reiterated
'(1905) 32 Mont. 354, 80 P. 918.
'(1909) 39 Mont. 367, 102 P. 860.
"Alywin v. Morley (1910) 41 Mont. 191, 108 P. 778; Reid v. Hennessy
Mercantile Co. (1912) 45 Mont. 383, 123 P. 397; Anaconda National
Bank v. Keely (1926) 75 Mont. 401, 244 P. 141; Missoula Light & Water Co. v. Hughes (1938) 106 Mont. 355, 77 P. (2d) 1041; Kommers v.
Palagi (1940) 111 Mont. 293, 108 P. (2d) 208; Estey v. Haughian
(1941) 112 Mont. 36, 113 P. (2d) 325; Downing v. Crippen (1943) 114
Mont. 436, 138 P. (2d) 575; Spratt v. Pfeifle (1943) 115 Mont. 232, 142
P. (2d) 563; O'Hare v. Johnson (1944) 116 Mont. 410, 153 P. (2d) 888;
Bickford v. Bickford (1945) 117 Mont. 372, 158 P. (2d) 796; Sweeney
v. Francis (1945) 117 Mont. 1, 152 P. (2d) 546; Hogevoll v. Hogevoll
(1945) 117 Mont. 528, 162 P. (2d) 218; Whitcomb v. Koechel (1945)
117 Mont. 329, 158 P. (2d) 496; Van Voast v. Blaine County (1946) 118
Mont. 375, 167 P. (2d) 563; State ex rel. Anderson v. Gile (1946) 119
Mont. 182, 172 P. (2d) 583; Boggs v. Boggs (1947) 119 Mont. 540, 177
P. (2d) 869; Fuller v. Gibbs (1947) 119 Mont. 511, 177 P. (2d) 858;
Bell McCall Co. v. Caplice (1947) 119 Mont. 463, 175 P. (2d) 416;
Demos v. Deopker (1947) 120 Mont. 243, 182 P. (2d) 469; Ryan v.
Bloom (1947) 120 Mont. 443, 186 P. (2d) 879, cert. den. 333 U.S. 874.
It is impossible to say whether the following cases apply the fore-

going line of authority or the compromise doctrine of Bordeaux v.
Bordeaux. Atkinson v. Roosevelt County (1924) 71 Mont. 165, 227 P.
811; Welch v. Thomas (1936) 102 Mont. 591, 61 P. (2d) 404.
5(1920) 57 Mont. 197, 187 P. 1009.
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its statement and refused to alter its holding. The value of the
case as a precedent is slightly impaired by its reliance to a great
extent on cases involving appeals from judgments at law, including one case decided before 1903. The equity cases which it
cites, Boyd v. Huffine and Winslow v. Dundom," are cases following Bordeauxe and Finlen v. Heinze' and clearly do not support the statement for which they are cited.
A recent case is equally explicit in equating the "decided
preponderance" language of the cases following the Bordeaux
case with the "substantial evidence" language used where the
appeal is from a judgment rendered on the verdict of a jury.'
This was the case of Sanders v. Lucas,' a suit for specific performance of an option contract. The factual issue was whether
one of the defendants, who had been plaintiff's attorney, had
taken the option for his own benefit, or on behalf of the plaintiff. The evidence as to what had been written and said and
understood by the parties was in conflict. The Court affirmed
a judgment for the plaintiff. On the question of its power to
review the facts it first stated the familiar rule that although
the statute gives the Court power to review the facts, it will only
reverse where the evidence "decidedly preponderates" against
the findings, citing the Nagle' case, which is some authority for
that language. The Court then said that the evidence does not
decidedly preponderate against the findings when there is substantial evidence to support them, so that there will be no reversal if substantial evidence supports the findings. The clear
impression conveyed by this that law and equity are no longer
to be distinguished is made all the stronger by the court's citation of an action at law to support its reasoning.' Likewise it
has since been cited and followed in actions at law, indicating
51(1911) 44 Mont. 30K, 120 P. 228.
" (1912) 46 Mont. 71, 125 P. 136.
8(1905) 32 Mont. 159, 80 P. 6.
'(1905) 32 Mont. 354, 80 P. 918.
®See for an example of an appeal from an action at law Ely v. Montana
Federation of Labor (1945) 117 Mont. 609, 160 P. (2d) 752, an action
at law for salary in which the Court says, "The function of this Court,
in reviewing the evidence, is limited to a determination whether or not
there is substantial evidence to support the findings."
"(1941) 111 Mont. 599, 111 P. (2d) 1041.
"State ex rel. Nagle v. Naughton (1936) 103 Mont. 306, 63 P. (2d) 123.
But this case also contains language to the effect that the trial court's
findings are to be treated just like a jury verdict.
"Dalbey v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (1937) 105 Mont. 587, 74 P.
(2d) 432, an action on a life insurance policy, which states that a
trial court's finding will not be reversed if evidence furnishes reasonable grounds for different conclusions.
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that some other members of the Court agree that there should
be no such distinction."
Since Sanders v. Lucas' there have been a substantial number of eases following it in its narrow limitation on the scope of
review in equity cases." This line of cases must be included in
the number of those earlier cases which adopted the same attitude," so that the two groups of cases together make up a large
body of authority for this position. One cannot help observing,
however, that a very great majority of these cases do not cite the
1903 statute, whether purposely or inadvertently, it is impossible to say. Nevertheless they must be considered on this question.
In view of the foregoing, it would be very easy to conclude
that it had become settled in Montana that the scope of review
in equity and at law are now the same. Unfortunately such a
conclusion appears to be erroneous, if the case of Miller v.
Miller" is considered. In that case, a suit to quiet title to land,
a decree for the plaintiff was reversed and the case remanded
with directions to dismiss the bill. The majority opinion quotes
from the 1903 statute, now R.C.M. 1947, Section 93-216, italicizing the portion authorizing a review of the facts, but gives the
question no discussion. The plaintiff's title depended upon a
deed which was in evidence but which had never been executed,
and also upon his contention that a prior executed deed had been
destroyed. The evidence on the latter point was oral and conflicting. The majority stated it and discussed it in great detail
before holding that the plaintiff had not sustained his burden
of proof, apparently assuming that in an equity case it had
broad powers to review the facts.
Mr. Justice Metcalfe dissented, together with Mr. Justice
Gibson, partly in disagreement about the Court's power of review in equity. This dissent is important in that it is the only
case the writer has been able to find in which the Court has
divided on this issue, with a dissenting opinion, even though
"Christianson v. Mineoff (1945) 118 Mont. 139, 164 P. (2d) 344; Gilbert

v. Bostona Mines Co. (1948) 121 Mont. 397, 195 P. (2d) 376.
1(1941) 111 Mont. 599, 111 P. (2d) 1041.
'In re Choiniere's Estate (1945) 117 Mont. 65, 156 P. (2d) 635; Davenport v. Townsend (1945) 117 Mont. 75, 157 P. (2d) 477; Bauer v.
Monroe (1945) 117 Mont. 306, 158 P. (2d) 485; Walker v. Mink (1945)
117 Mont. 351, 158 P. (2d) 630; Johnson v. Meers (1946) 118 Mont.
258, 164 P. (2d) 1012; Lake v. Webber (1948) 120 Mont. 534, 188 P.
(2d) 416; Hankins v. Waitt (1948) 120 Mont. 596, 189 P. (2d) 666;
Laas v. All Persons etc. (1948) 121 Mont. 43, 189 P. (2d) 670.
'Supra, note 54.
(1948) 121 Mont. 55, 190 P. (2d) 72.
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there is a wealth of conflicting authority. The dissenting judges
admitted that equity cases are controlled by the statute and conceded that the statute gives the Court "more latitude in its review of the facts"' than it has in an action at law. After making this concession the dissent cited the constitutional provision
for only one form of civil action," and then quoted from a law
review article which states that Montana has construed away the
force of the statute." It is common enough knowledge that courts
sometimes do nullify legislation by "construction, " but it is unusually candid for a judge, even in a dissenting opinion, to concede that that is what he is advocating. Nevertheless, such a
process of "construction" is open to serious objection, especially
where, as in this instance, the court admits that the statute commands a different rule for equity. And even if the statute as
written was not clear, apart from its history, the earlier cases
which construed it as changing the scope of review should be
recognized as giving it a meaning different from that contended
for by Justice Metealfe, a meaning which should not casually be
overruled.
In support of this contention that all life has been construed
out of the statute, the Miller dissent quoted from Watkins v.
Watkins," which does sustain it. The dissent also stated that it has
been settled by a long line of cases, starting with Ming v. Truett"
that findings of a trial judge can only be upset if not based upon
substantial evidence. This statement can be criticized on several
grounds, the most obvious of which is that it assumes, without
0121 Mont. at 78, 190 P. (2d) at 83.
"Mont. Const., Art. VIII, § 28. Justice Metcalfe did not argue that the
statute is unconstitutional under this section, but merely cited it to indicate that law and equity are no longer separate systems, and no longer
have so many procedural differences. No case seems to have considered this particular question of constitutionality in this state. It
does not appear to be a substantial question. The Constitution does
not abolish all distinctions between legal and equitable actions. Frisbee
v. Coburn (1935) 101 Mont. 58, 52 P. (2d) 882; 1 POMEROY, EQITY
JURISPRUDENcE (5th ed. 1941) § 40. Other procedural distinctions have
been kept, such as In new trials R.C.M. 1947, § 93-5602 (9396). The
statute therefore would appear to be constitutional.
"Clark and Stone, Review of Finding8 of Fact, 4 CHICAGO LAW REviEw
190, at p. 215 (1937).
"Hughes, THE SupR m COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1928) 280; See
for an example of this type of "construction" by the Supreme Court,
U.S. v. Elgin, J. & E.R.R. Co. (1935) 298 U.S. 422, and Mr. Justice
Stone's dissenting opinion, at p. 512, to the effect that upon the majority's construction of the statute, "one is at a loss to say what scope
remains for the operation of the statute." See also Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statites 47 Cor. L. Ray. 527 (1947).
"(1909) 39 Mont. 367, 102 P. 860, Supra, notes 49 and 53.
"(1871) 1 Mont. 322.
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saying so, that the statute of 1903 never did have any effect.
That can hardly be the case. Justice Metcalfe's dissent itself
argued that the statute's present debility was the result of the
Supreme Court's treatment of it rather than of its own inherent
weakness. The statute, as has been argued, apart from its history, is somewhat ambiguous, but certainly the Hays, Bordeaux
and Finlen cases stand opposed to any contention that it made
no change in prior law. Although it is, therefore, not true that
the law had been settled on the point, this dissent clearly does
have strong case law support. In fact the case" just preceding
Miller v. Miller in volume 121 of the Montana reports seems to
support Justice Metcalfe's dissent, as do many other recent
T
cases.

The foregoing account brings the development of this problem down nearly to the present and raises the question of what
the Supreme Court's present position is. There is authority, as
this paper has attempted to point out, for saying that the Supreme Court may act in any one of three ways upon an appeal
from an equity decree: (1) It may examine the record in detail
and make an independent decision, without regard to the trial
court's findings." (2) It may review the record somewhat more
closely than in an action at law, but still pay some attention to
the findings below, reversing them only when the evidence
"clearly preponderates" against them. (3) It may treat the
trial court's findings just as it would the verdict of a jury, and
reverse only where they are not supported by substantial evidence. The distinction between (2) and (3) is by no means
perfectly plain in all the cases, but it can be discerned by a
comparison, for example, of Bordeaux v. Bordeaux" with Watkins v. Watkinse or with Sanders v. Lucas.' In view of the very
large number of cases and the lack of agreement among them as
to the effect of the 1903 statute it appears to the writer to be impossible to predict in a given case which of the three alternative
rules would be followed by the Court.
The first alternative has only slight authority in its favor.'
It has the virtues of being in agreement with the purpose of the
1903 statute, judging from its history, and of being a clear def"Laas v. All Persons etc. (1948) 121 Mont. 43, 189 P. (2d) 67, Supra,
note 66.
"Supra, notes 54, 66.
"For arguments against the broad powers of review, see Clark and
Stone, Review of Finding8 of Fact, 4 CHI. L. R. 190 (1937).
u(1905) 32 Mont. 159, 80 P. 6.
T(1909) 39 Mont. 367, 102 P. 860.
10(1941) 111 Mont. 599, 111 P. (2d) 1041.
'Supra, note 23.
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inition of the Supreme Court's power. It has the great defect
of placing the trial of issues of fact before a tribunal not
equipped to try such issues. it has the additional defect, also
serious, of imposing a great deal of additional work on the
court by requiring the full examination of long records, weighing of evidence, inspection of exhibits, judgment of credibility
and all the other labor involved in deciding cases de novo. Presumably its adoption would further increase the Court's work by
inducing more losing litigants to appeal on questions of fact.
At any rate, it can probably be discarded as a practicable alternative, although some very recent cases may, be using this approach."
The second alternative is the product of a much stronger
line of authority. The chief difficulty with it is its vagueness,
although that might in some quarters be considered an advantage, since it would allow flexibility in the Supreme Court's review of matters of fact. It does not tell the practicing attorney
much about his chances for getting a reversal, or upholding a
judgment on appeal, however, since he can never be sure just
how persuasive the trial court's findings will be.
This compromise doctrine does seem preferable to the view
that the Supreme Court can exercise an unfettered, independent
judgment on matters of fact, because it takes account of the
Supreme Court's lack of opportunity to form such a judgment.
That lack of opportunity is recognized in most other states having similar statutes, where the appellate courts have limited
their own powers of reviewing facts to a similar extent.' It is
also recognized in the federal courts, where on review of judge"Higby v. Hooper ...... Mont ....... 221 P. (2d) 1043 reverses the findings
after a thorough review of the evidence, citing, but not commenting
upon, P.C.M. 1947 § 93-216 (8805). Hart v. Barron (1949) ....Mont......
204 P. (2d) 797 is a similar case, reversing a judgment for the plaintiff and directing entry of a judgment for the defendant. Justice Metcalfe, concurring specially, adhered to his dissent in Miller v. Miller,
Supra, note 68. Here again the statute was cited by the majority without comment Query as to Hanson v. Lancaster, (1951) ...... Mont ......
226 P. (2d) 105, in which a decree was also reversed for error in finding the facts. The question of the scope of review was not discussed,
and the Court may have felt that the findings could not be supported
on any theory. Bauer v. Monroe (1945) 117 Mont. 306, 158 P. (2d)
485 also seems to review the facts independently, as the dissent evidently thought.
'Heard v. Heard (1948) 323 Mass. 357, 82 N.E. (2d) 219; in re Norman's Estate (1939) 161 Ore. 450, 88 P. (2d) 977; Jensen v. Howell
(1929) 75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034; Widman v. Maurer (1943) 19 Wash.
(2d) 28, 141 P. (2d) 135. Apparently North Dakota gives a full and
independent review of facts. State v. City of Williston (1943) 72 N.D.
486, 8 N.W. (2d) 564.
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tried cases the appellate court may only upset findings of fact
where they are "clearly erroneous.' ''
The third alternative would seem superior to either of the
other two, however, if the statute of 1903 did not stand in the
way. Its strength is its simplicity, of course. If either of the
other two doctrines is used, complexities are caused in a field
already more complex than it should be. For instance, in any
appeal the Supreme Court would have first to decide whether
the case was legal or equitable, which is not always a simple
matter. If the main suit were legal, but an equitable crosscomplaint had been filed, presumably the Court would have to
review one phase of the case narrowly and the other broadly.'
If a single cause of action involved both legal and equitable
remedies, perhaps the Court would try to decide which of the
two was crucial, or predominant, and characterize the action accordingly.' The fact that courts seldom bother to discuss these
technicalities leads to the inference that they sensibly recognize
the futility of such discussion. Yet the technicalities are there
and should be dealt with if the statutory distinction is to be
observed, and it should be observed so long as the statute remains in the code, unless a strong line of cases is to be overruled. As long as it is in the code, therefore, it would seem that
appeals in equity should be treated differently from appeals at
law, unless the Court wishes to adopt the dubious expedient of
repealing the statute by construction.
Enough has been said to reveal the writer's conviction that
the statute ought to be repealed so that the Court may be free to
apply the substantial evidence rule and to end the conflict in the
cases. It does not have that freedom at present, because of the
statute, but rather is faced with a dilemma created by the conSRule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 2 BARON d HoLTzOFF,
F7EDERz
A PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1950) § 1133; 3 MOORE, FEDLERAL
PRACTICE (1938) § 52.01.
Mont .......
, 221 P. (2d)
'This was the case in Higby v. Hooper (1950) ----1043, where the plaintiff sued for damages for breach of a building
contract and the defendant filed a cross-complaint for foreclosure of
a mechanic's lien. Both the trial court and the Supreme Court treated
this as a suit in equity, but the main suit was clearly an action at law.
Even the suit to foreclose a mechanic's lien has been held in Montana to be a blend of law and equity. Wertz v. Lamb (1911) 43 Mont.
477, 117 P. 89. Such a case presents a preliminary problem of characterization which just cannot be solved in a satisfactory manner. In
White v. Chastain (Mo. App., 1939), 123 S.W. (2d) 548, the court apparently did attempt to distinguish between the main case and the
cross-complaint, but actually treated them alike in reviewing the facts.
"That was done in Crowley v. Ballard (1939) 279 Ky. 484, 131 S.W. (2d)
463. See also Carroll v. Bullock (1913) 207 N. Y. 567, 101 N.E. 438;
Di Menna v. Cooper (1917) 220 N. Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993.
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flict between the statute and the necessities of appellate procedure. Two other observations can be made. One relates to the
effect of such needless technicalities upon public opinion. If an
informed person should ask why it is that the Supreme Court
in one case was able to upset the trial judge's findings, but was
not able to do so in another, although both cases came up from
the same judge and were tried by precisely the same procedure,
the only possible answer would be that it is because in 1903 the
Amalgamated Copper Company could not get a fair trial in
Butte, and because in the Eighteenth Century English legal history had occurred in such a way as to develop a distinction between the two cases. And if this person were then to comment
that such reasons are interesting to an antiquarian but hardly
satisfactory to justify an appellate procedure in 1951, we could
only agree. It is perhaps this sort of useless legal distinction
which helps to account for the impression of many persons that
the law is not primarily concerned with the sensible adjustment
of disputes.
The writer is well aware that cynical persons may argue that
any discussion of appellate court opinions on this issue is futile
because the court will act about in the same way, regardless of
whether it has before it an equity suit or an action at law, and
regardless of what its opinions may say on the subject. With
the more or less unfounded belief that this is not so, that there
is a distinction, and that the difference in the attitude of the
Court toward the two types of case, even though not capable of
any precise definition, would be reflected in a difference in the
outcome of cases, an investigation was made of cases in this
state, beginning with Volume 29 of the Montana reports and
concluding with Volume 225 Pacific (2d), number 4. The cases
looked at were those in which the opinions indicated that a contention had been made on appeal that the evidence did not sustain the findings or the verdict. A count was kept of actions at
law and suits in equity, and of the number of cases in which
this contention was upheld or denied by the Court in each kind
of action. Where a single important finding was held unsupported the case was counted as one in which the contention was
sustained. The count is not claimed to be complete, but it contains a large enough proportion of the total cases to be reliable
as showing what the Court has done since the 1903 statute was
enacted.
One hundred and forty-four appeals from actions at law
were counted, in nineteen of which the claim of no substantial
evidence to sustain the verdict was upheld, and in one hundred
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twenty-five of which it was denied. This means that in 13.20%
of these cases the verdict was held unsupported by substantial
evidence, or the findings of the judge were reversed, in jurywaived cases.
The count for equity cases was one hundred and thirty. Of
these, findings were reversed as unsupported by evidence in
thirty-two cases, and affirmed in ninety-eight cases. The percentage of reversals here is 24.62%, or nearly twice as large as
in actions at law. Although of course that figure is of no help
in deciding what the Court will do in a specific case, it does
support the argument of this paper that the 1903 statute has not
been entirely repealed by construction. It also is some evidence
of the need for repeal of that statute if the scope of review is to
be the same in suits in equity as it now is in actions at law, aresult which would seem to be highly desirable.
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